Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 1819: Code injection #4916
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
![github-actions[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/15368?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Great job, @ajay-dhangar! 🎉 Thank you for submitting your pull request to CodeHarborHub. We appreciate your contribution and enthusiasm! Our team will review it soon. If you have any questions or need further assistance, feel free to reach out. Thanks for contributing!
Contributor
|
Here's the code health analysis summary for commits Analysis Summary
|
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Potential fix for https://github.com/codeharborhub/codeharborhub.github.io/security/code-scanning/1819
To fix the problem, we should follow the recommended pattern: bind the untrusted value (
github.event.issue.body) to an environment variable using workflow expression syntax, and then access it inside the shell using native shell variable expansion (e.g.$ISSUE_BODY) instead of${{ ... }}. This prevents the untrusted content from being parsed as part of the shell script itself.The best minimal fix without changing functionality is to modify the
Validate Issue Contentstep so that:env:section mappingISSUE_BODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}.run:script reads this environment variable using shell syntax, e.g.issue_body="$ISSUE_BODY"or directly uses$ISSUE_BODYin the condition.${{ github.event.issue.body }}inside therun:script.Concretely, in
.github/workflows/issue_creation_workflow.yml, lines 34–41 should be updated. We add anenv:block to theValidate Issue Contentstep and replaceissue_body="${{ github.event.issue.body }}"withissue_body="$ISSUE_BODY". No new imports or external dependencies are required; this is purely a YAML/Actions configuration change.Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.